Are fingerprint identifications merely an opinion?

The short answer to the ques­tion to ques­tion that is the title of the post is an unequiv­o­cal yes!

There is a very good arti­cle that was pub­lished in the Daily Tele­graph which is a daily morn­ing news­pa­per that has a wide dis­tri­b­u­tion pri­mar­ily in the United king­dom, but also internationally.

It is pre­sented here as it was found online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8957319/Fingerprint-evidence-should-be-regarded-as-opinion-not-fact.html

Fin­ger­print evi­dence ‘should be regarded as opin­ion not fact’

Evi­dence from fin­ger­prints should be “recog­nised as opin­ion and not fact”, a pub­lic inquiry has recommended.

The report concluded that fingerprint evidence should be 'recognised as opinion evidence and not fact'

The report con­cluded that fin­ger­print evi­dence should be ‘recog­nised as opin­ion evi­dence and not fact’ Photo: REX

7:00AM GMT 15 Dec 2011

The inves­ti­ga­tion was ordered after a for­mer police offi­cer was accused of per­jury when a fin­ger­print found at a mur­der scene was wrongly iden­ti­fied as hers.

Tom Nel­son, the direc­tor of foren­sic ser­vices at the Scot­tish Police Ser­vices Author­ity (SPSA), pub­licly apol­o­gised to Shirley McKie and her fam­ily for the “errors that took place” and the “sub­se­quent pain” it had caused them.

Mr Nel­son said the inquiry’s report “chal­lenges the infal­li­bil­ity of fin­ger­print evi­dence”, and added: “We accept that this will be a huge cul­tural change for fin­ger­print exam­in­ers across the world.’’

Miss McKie, a for­mer detec­tive con­sta­ble with Strath­clyde Police, was tried for per­jury after insist­ing a fin­ger­print found in the home of mur­der vic­tim Mar­ion Ross in 1997 did not belong to her.

She was later cleared of lying under oath and in Feb­ru­ary 2006 was given £750,000 in an out-of-court settlement.

In his report, Sir Anthony Camp­bell, the inquiry chair­man, con­cluded that fin­ger­print evi­dence should be “recog­nised as opin­ion evi­dence and not fact”.

A for­mer North­ern Ire­land appeal court judge, Sir Anthony said the fin­ger­print in ques­tion had been “misiden­ti­fied as the fin­ger­print of Miss McKie”.

He also said a fin­ger­print found in the home of David Asbury, con­victed then cleared of mur­der­ing Miss Ross, had also been misiden­ti­fied as belong­ing to the dead woman.

But he put this down to “human error” and said there was “no con­spir­acy against Miss McKie”. Sir Anthony also rec­om­mended that spe­cial processes be devel­oped for com­plex fin­ger­print marks, say­ing these should be exam­ined by three experts who should reach their con­clu­sions inde­pen­dently, mak­ing notes at each stage.

Fin­ger­print exam­in­ers per­form “impor­tant, dif­fi­cult and at times com­plex work”, Sir Anthony said, adding that his rec­om­men­da­tions were “designed to assist them to these challenges’’.

Foren­sic experts Hugh Macpher­son, Charles Stew­art, Fiona McBride and Anthony McKenna had orig­i­nally iden­ti­fied the mark found in Miss Ross’s home as being made by Miss McKie. They said they were “dis­ap­pointed in some of the find­ings of the inquiry”.

The SPSA will draw up a plan to make the nec­es­sary improve­ments and in Jan­u­ary will begin a new approach to deal­ing with com­plex fin­ger­print marks, in line with the inquiry rec­om­men­da­tions. The SPSA has accepted the inquiry’s find­ings and rec­om­men­da­tions in full.

Last night Miss McKie’s father, Iain, wel­comed Mr Nelson’s apology.

He said: “He apol­o­gised to Shirley and myself and our fam­ily for the mis­takes that were made in the past. Its an extremely impor­tant apol­ogy because it’s the first time I have ever heard any­one say sorry.’’

Mr McKie added: “No father can stand by and see his daugh­ter assaulted and abused, because that’s what the sys­tem did to Shirley.” Miss McKie, 49, was not present at the press con­fer­ence when Sir Anthony pre­sented his find­ings. But her father said she was left “speech­less” when he told her the SPSA had apologised.

In what could prove to be a land­mark devel­op­ment in foren­sic sci­ence to both law enforce­ment and for the Inno­cence Project,  we want to present to you the recent work of Dr Xan­the Spindler of Uni­ver­sity Tech­nol­ogy Syd­ney. She has pub­lished that she has devel­oped a new method of devel­op­ing what hereto­fore would be undis­cov­ered and non-discoverable fingerprints.

Now we have writ­ten on fin­ger­prints before:

If val­i­dated and fur­ther research ver­i­fies Dr. Spindler’s claims, we will have a new method fingerprints.

Latent fingermarks from a male donor developed on aluminium foil. Image provided by Xanthe Spindler
Latent fin­ger­marks from a male donor devel­oped on alu­minium foil. Image pro­vided by Xan­the Spindler

Recently pub­lished in Chem­i­cal Com­mu­ni­ca­tions (“Enhance­ment of latent fin­ger­marks on non-porous sur­faces using anti-L-amino acid anti­bod­ies con­ju­gated to gold nanopar­ti­cles”), a jour­nal of the Royal Soci­ety of Chem­istry, the work is also a step in pur­suit of the “Holy Grail” as Dr Spindler calls it, a reli­able method for recov­er­ing fin­ger­prints from human skin.

The new method devel­oped by Dr Spindler as part of her PhD work uses anti­bod­ies designed to tar­get amino acids and can detect aged, dry and weak fin­ger­prints that can­not be cap­tured using tra­di­tional fin­ger­print­ing methods.

We’ve been able to suc­cess­fully tar­get amino acids on non-porous sur­faces for the first time, with promis­ing results in enhanc­ing aged and degraded fin­ger­marks that typ­i­cally give poor results with tra­di­tional pow­der­ing and cyano­acry­late fum­ing. The poten­tial is there to go back to old cases to see what might now be recovered.

Dr Spindler.

Amino Acid
How the basic tech­nol­ogy works

From the abstract:

Enan­tios­e­lec­tive anti–L–amino acid anti­bod­ies con­ju­gated to gold nanopar­ti­cles are shown to facil­i­tate the detec­tion of latent fin­ger­marks by inter­act­ing with amino acids present in fric­tion ridge secre­tions. This antibody-based sys­tem is par­tic­u­larly effec­tive for the enhance­ment of aged and dried fin­ger­marks on non-porous sur­faces, an area unex­ploited by cur­rent techniques.

 

Some folks seem to think that lab­o­ra­tory errors are con­fined to local lab­o­ra­to­ries and rouge out-of-control iso­lated agents who are either sloppy or up to no good. Intu­itively, we know this is not true. Lab­o­ra­to­ries are run by humans. Humans make mis­takes. Some humans delib­er­ately lie to get what they want and to keep them­selves in a job and/or out of trou­ble. Although we want and demand our lab­o­ra­to­ries in the crim­i­nal world to be per­fect, they can’t be. This is why we need to have over­sight of the lab­o­ra­tory and trans­parency to assure that true ver­i­fi­ca­tion is pos­si­ble. All results need to be ana­lyzed skep­ti­cally. Valid­ity needs to be proven, not presumed.

One of my favorite quotes in sci­ence comes from Prof. Emer­i­tus Peter Stein. He once famously wrote:

You get judged by Eng­lish Com­mon Law.
You are inno­cent until proven guilty.
Mea­sure­ment sys­tems must be judged by Napoleonic Law.
They are guilty until proven innocent.

http://www.waynefarley.com/aviation/images/thumb/human-error.jpg

When is it sim­ply oops and when does it become fraud?

When is it sim­ply oops and when does it become inten­tional fraud where peo­ple should be indicted and go to jail?

Too many times it seems as if lab­o­ra­to­ries are quick to claim an “oops” moment. If it can­not sim­ply be an “oops” moment, the offender is made to look like a lone wolf or a rogue agent. They are made into a true scape­goat. In turn for not protest­ing being so labelled, the quickly labelled lone wolf is not indicted or charged, but sim­ply allowed to retire or in rare cases is fired.

When is enough enough?

Peo­ple go to jail over these results.

Their lives get destroyed.

There is no way to put it back together again.

Yet, the fraud­u­lent sys­tem keeps on grind­ing away in the sausage-grinder that is our jus­tice sys­tem. All that ana­lyst or lab­o­ra­tory has to do is endure a short news cycle of embar­rass­ment and then con­tinue on with the ana­lyst allowed to retire and the lab­o­ra­tory giv­ing pub­lic assur­ances that all is well and every­thing is fixed.

How is this justice?

How is this fair?

More errors sur­face at mil­i­tary crime lab

By MARISA TAYLOR AND MICHAEL DOYLE

McClatchy News­pa­pers

WASHINGTON-The military’s pre­mier crime lab has botched more evi­dence test­ing than was pre­vi­ously known, rais­ing broader ques­tions about the qual­ity of the foren­sic work relied on to con­vict sol­diers, sailors, air­men and Marines.

Now, two sen­a­tors want the Pen­ta­gon to open a full inves­ti­ga­tion. If they start look­ing, Pen­ta­gon offi­cials will find that the crime lab’s prob­lems extend beyond one dis­cred­ited analyst.

The scrutiny comes after McClatchy pub­lished a series of sto­ries detail­ing how a for­mer long­time foren­sics ana­lyst at the Army Crim­i­nal Inves­ti­ga­tion Lab­o­ra­tory made false state­ments and mis­han­dled dozens of tests.

A follow-up McClatchy inves­ti­ga­tion reveals that a sec­ond lab ana­lyst, respon­si­ble for firearms, was fired for mak­ing a false state­ment and destroy­ing evi­dence. The lab sub­se­quently had to review 541 firearms cases to make sure they were thor­ough, prop­erly con­ducted and met legal require­ments. Ulti­mately, offi­cials deter­mined that none of them needed full retesting.

More recently, a third lab ana­lyst, who han­dles fin­ger­prints, was found to have erred in at least three cases, one involv­ing murder.

But the pre­vi­ously undis­closed prob­lems go beyond dis­cred­ited or flawed indi­vid­ual ana­lysts. Some lab employ­ees “do not like … (the) lead­er­ship style” of a top lab man­ager, an Army offi­cial said in a court depo­si­tion in March. Six dis­crim­i­na­tion or retal­i­a­tion com­plaints have been filed against lab man­age­ment in the past three years. One was filed by the lab’s for­mer chief attor­ney, who had helped over­see pre­vi­ous inter­nal inves­ti­ga­tions into the lab’s mistakes.

The prob­lem is not with just one per­son, but sys­temic,” said David Shel­don, an attor­ney for a for­mer Navy man who is chal­leng­ing the lab’s work in an appeal to the Supreme Court. “It’s as if (the lab) has had no over­sight, and one has to seri­ously ques­tion whether or not it can effec­tively police itself.”

The Atlanta-based lab, com­monly known as USACIL, serves all the mil­i­tary branches, han­dling evi­dence in more than 3,000 cases a year. The direc­tor, Larry Chelko, has been in charge since 1993.

On May 12, Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., the Sen­ate Judi­ciary Com­mit­tee chair­man, joined a Repub­li­can mem­ber of the com­mit­tee in ask­ing the Defense Department’s inspec­tor gen­eral to inves­ti­gate the alleged mis­con­duct of one ana­lyst, Phillip Mills.

Fal­si­fied lab tests could have con­tributed to crim­i­nals remain­ing free and inno­cent peo­ple being wrong­fully con­victed,” wrote Leahy and Sen. Charles Grass­ley, R-Iowa. “The fail­ure to address these issues in a timely man­ner could dam­age the nation’s trust in the mil­i­tary jus­tice system.”

Lab offi­cials have vig­or­ously defended their over­sight and the han­dling of mis­takes and misconduct.

As with all crime labs across the county, human error does occur from time to time,” the Army’s Crim­i­nal Inves­ti­ga­tion Com­mand, which over­sees the lab, said in a pre­pared state­ment. “The con­trol mech­a­nisms designed to iden­tify and cor­rect those issues have proven very effective.”

The Army added that the lab’s lead­er­ship, includ­ing Chelko, han­dled the prob­lems appropriately.

Still, lab offi­cials have been said noth­ing to news media and slow to inform defense attor­neys about mistakes.

The lab never pub­licly acknowl­edged the extent of the prob­lem with Mills’ work. Many defense attor­neys never learned of retest­ing. When McClatchy asked whether other ana­lysts had made mis­takes, the mil­i­tary ini­tially refused to say, acknowl­edg­ing prob­lems only when con­fronted with details obtained from out­side sources.

The mil­i­tary also turned down or responded nar­rowly to numer­ous open records requests McClatchy filed that sought more infor­ma­tion about Mills’ cases, cit­ing pri­vacy rights.

Mil­i­tary offi­cials say they can’t com­ment in detail about the most recent mis­takes for fear of taint­ing jurors. They also can’t dis­cuss the dis­crim­i­na­tion alle­ga­tions because of pri­vacy laws.

McClatchy pieced together a fuller pic­ture after inde­pen­dently obtain­ing mil­i­tary doc­u­ments and con­duct­ing dozens of interviews.

In March, McClatchy revealed the military’s three-year, $1.4 mil­lion inter­nal review of Mills’ work. The review­ers dis­agreed with Mills’ DNA results 55 per­cent of the time. More broadly, they found that Mills neglected tests and over­looked evi­dence. Mak­ing mat­ters worse, offi­cials found that evi­dence had been rou­tinely destroyed by inves­ti­ga­tors in hun­dreds of other cases and there­fore could not be retested. The inves­ti­ga­tors were fol­low­ing pol­icy at the time.

The result,” foren­sics ana­lyst Robert Shaler noted in an inde­pen­dent review of the lab, “might have led to a mis­car­riage of justice.”

While inves­ti­gat­ing Mills, lab offi­cials learned of firearms ana­lyst Michael Brooks’ mistake.

Brooks had said he had exam­ined a hat for gun­shot residue and con­cluded that the weapon had been fired at close range. His super­vi­sor, how­ever, later found that the hat hadn’t been tested. The vic­tim allegedly had shot him­self in the right tem­ple, but the hole in the hat was on the left side.

Brooks, who could not be reached for com­ment, later destroyed evi­dence from the case file and lied about his actions, inves­ti­ga­tors concluded.

The lab fired him in 2006.

More recently, a latent-fingerprint exam­iner has been found to have missed sev­eral prints. The exam­iner is not accused of mis­con­duct, but her mis­takes could cast doubt on the over­all qual­ity of the lab’s work.

The examiner’s mis­takes came up ear­lier this year in a pre-indictment hear­ing for Army Spc. Nef­taly Platero. He is accused of killing two of his 3rd Infantry Divi­sion room­mates and wound­ing a third in Iraq last year.

The foren­sic evi­dence is espe­cially impor­tant in Platero’s case because the vic­tim who sur­vived doesn’t remem­ber the events, said Platero’s attor­ney, Guy Womack.

Wom­ack received two sep­a­rate fin­ger­print reports with trou­bling dif­fer­ences pre­pared by lab exam­iner Shauna Stef­fan. In the sec­ond report, she iden­ti­fied Platero’s prints where she hadn’t noticed them before. The lab wasn’t required to directly inform Wom­ack of the rea­sons for the dis­par­ity, but he learned of it cross-examination.

I asked why it was retested and she started squirm­ing,” Wom­ack said.

A review of Steffan’s other work found that she made sim­i­lar mis­takes in two other cases, Wom­ack said.

When con­tacted by McClatchy, Stef­fan said she was instructed not to talk to the media. The Army later said Stef­fan didn’t want to be interviewed.

Known as “missed iden­ti­fi­ca­tions,” Steffan’s mis­takes are an “inevitable part of foren­sic latent-print case­work in all lab­o­ra­to­ries,” the Army said in a pre­pared state­ment. Mil­i­tary offi­cials stressed that Stef­fan didn’t make the more seri­ous error in the mur­der case of misiden­ti­fy­ing prints, and that a cor­rected report was issued before the trial.

Wom­ack also rep­re­sented one of two con­victed mur­der­ers whose evi­dence Mills examined.

Mills was found to have missed blood­stains in the 2002 mur­der case against Army Pfcs. Jonathan Schroeder and Andrew Humis­ton, who pleaded guilty to beat­ing a fel­low sol­dier to death. The lapse called into ques­tion the qual­ity of Mills’ work and the lab’s thor­ough­ness in inform­ing defen­dants of what had gone wrong.

Wom­ack, Humiston’s attor­ney, said he didn’t know about the long-ago retest­ing of the evi­dence until McClatchy informed him recently.

It’s shady deal­ing on their part,” Wom­ack said. “If the lab was a stand-up orga­ni­za­tion, you would have thought they would have reported that.”

Wom­ack isn’t the only one who’s been left in the dark.

As McClatchy revealed in March, naval offi­cers Samuel Har­ris and Roger House were con­victed of charges related to a sex­ual mis­con­duct case and later exon­er­ated by the Mills retest­ing effort, but they learned about the retest­ing only by chance.

Mil­i­tary offi­cials said the lab fol­lowed proper evidence-sharing require­ments in Brooks’ and Mills’ cases by send­ing advi­sory memos to each mil­i­tary service’s legal division.

Nonethe­less, the non­par­ti­san National Insti­tute of Mil­i­tary Jus­tice is con­cerned that the mil­i­tary hasn’t made enough of an effort to inform defendants.

The insti­tute recently asked the Pentagon’s top lawyers to track down all for­mer ser­vice mem­bers who were con­victed with evi­dence Mills han­dled. From 1995 to 2005, Mills han­dled evi­dence in 465 cases.

On Thurs­day, the Pen­ta­gon rejected the request.

A sys­tem that pur­ports to be just must bring sun­light to this issue in order to put it to rest,” said Michelle Lindo McCluer, the institute’s exec­u­tive director.

Despite the Pentagon’s reluc­tance to take a closer look at the lab, oth­ers might.

Lab worker Albert Bell has filed a dis­crim­i­na­tion com­plaint with the Equal Employ­ment Oppor­tu­nity Com­mis­sion con­tend­ing that lab super­vi­sors engaged in a cam­paign of “harass­ment and intim­i­da­tion” because he is African-American.

My expe­ri­ence with the lab over­whelm­ingly tells me that the pri­mary mode is to cover up any mis­fea­sance,” said his attor­ney, Pete Lown.

And on May 27, Supreme Court jus­tices will decide whether to hear an appeal that attor­ney Shel­don filed on behalf of Ivor Luke, a for­mer Navy hos­pi­tal corpsman.

Luke was con­victed of inde­cent assault in 1999, in part with the help of Mills’ tes­ti­mony. Luke served his prison term. Because the evi­dence in his case had been destroyed, it couldn’t be retested after Mills’ errors emerged.

Although Luke’s appeal could be a long shot, it raises a fun­da­men­tal ques­tion about the mil­i­tary crime lab: How many mis­takes can any one ana­lyst, or any one lab, make before all the results must be second-guessed?

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces offered one answer when it rejected Luke’s appeal last Jan­u­ary. The court rea­soned that there was no indi­ca­tion that Mills botched Luke’s spe­cific case.

Luke’s lawyer argues that some gov­ern­ment wit­nesses can be so thor­oughly dis­cred­ited that they can’t be relied on at all.

In a 1956 Supreme Court rul­ing, the jus­tices threw out con­vic­tions based on the tes­ti­mony of an anti-communist infor­mant who offi­cials later came to believe had made false and “bizarre” claims in other cases.

The wit­ness “by his tes­ti­mony, has poi­soned the water in this reser­voir, and the reser­voir can­not be cleansed with­out first drain­ing it of all impu­rity,” Chief Jus­tice Earl War­ren wrote.

 

An inter­est­ing appli­ca­tion of fin­ger­print­ing to brass shell cas­ings has devel­oped in the last decade whereby a person’s latent fin­ger­prints may be devel­oped even after dis­charge or even after being whipped down.  This is due to the acid in our sweat secre­tions and the cor­ro­sion of the metal.

The tech­nol­ogy and the method exists, but is not used in the field.

FINGERPRINTS ON BRASS

A latent fin­ger­print will be left behind due to the sweat secre­tion deposited from an individual’s fin­ger. This print will leave an impres­sion of the pap­il­lary ridge pat­tern of the fin­ger and can be left on car­tridge cases. This print will then cause a slight cor­ro­sion of the metal, usu­ally brass, and with the right equip­ment, the print can be lifted in order to iden­tify who the print belongs to poten­tially [Blogger’s note:  please see our ear­lier blog con­cern­ing fin­ger­print iden­ti­fi­ca­tion as a foren­sic sci­ence dis­ci­pline that exposes the lim­i­ta­tion of the mod­ern practice].

SKP to develop fingerpritns off of brass shell casings

In order to lift the print an elec­tronic charge must first be applied to the car­tridge and then a pow­der with spher­i­cal beads is spread across the area where the fin­ger­print is located.  This involves a Scan­ning Kelvin Probe (SKP) tech­nique.  This pow­der will adhere to the nat­ural oils left on the car­tridge due to the human con­tact which makes it pos­si­ble to iden­tify the owner of the fin­ger­print.  Even after a fir­ing and wash­ing of a brass car­tridge an indi­vid­ual will still be able to visu­al­ize the fin­ger­prints left behind.

Fingerprints off of brass shell casings

Source:  “Human Fin­ger­print – Metal Inter­ac­tions Stud­ied using a Scan­ning Kelvin Probe” Geraint Williams and H. Neil McMur­ray, Mate­ri­als Research Cen­tre School of Engi­neer­ing Uni­ver­sity of Wales Swansea

 

Are fingerprints worthwhile?

Well, I sup­pose we should talk fin­ger­prints, right?

typical presentation and examination of fingerprint examination of the known

typ­i­cal pre­sen­ta­tion and exam­i­na­tion of fin­ger­print exam­i­na­tion of the known

FRICTION RIDGES

Ridges are the raised lay­ers of skin which con­tain open­ings for sweat glands and impart char­ac­ter­is­tics to a fin­ger­print of an indi­vid­ual. One of the ways to iden­tify a fin­ger­print is by using the Gal­ton points sys­tem which includes the minu­tiae char­ac­ter­is­tics of the fric­tion ridge such as the unique com­plex details of the ridge that divide, cross, and ter­mi­nate. In the United States the gen­eral approach in exam­in­ing a fin­ger­print is, analy­sis, com­par­i­son, eval­u­ate, and ver­ify (ACE-V). Dur­ing this analy­sis there are three (3) lev­els: the first level is to look at the gen­eral char­ac­ter­is­tics of the print (loops, arches, and whorls), the sec­ond level is to look at the points where the ridge ter­mi­nates or bifur­cates, to see whether there are pat­terns of islands, or to deter­mine whether there are dots and or forks, finally the third level con­sists of look for small pat­terns in the ridge width and con­tour and to con­sider pore distribution.

The classic determination and explanation of where the prints come from and why they are made

The clas­sic deter­mi­na­tion and expla­na­tion of where the prints come from and why they are made

One of the largest crit­i­cisms of fin­ger­print analy­sis, how­ever, is the pro­duc­tion of errors due to the cog­ni­tive and psy­cho­log­i­cal influ­ences which affect how peo­ple per­ceive infor­ma­tion and eval­u­ate it in mak­ing and reach­ing a con­clu­sion. This prob­lem is typ­i­cal and fre­quent in foren­sic evi­dence as a large amount of the exam­i­na­tion is focused on sub­jec­tive analysis.

Ouhnane versus Mayfiled the classic, but not only, example of cognitive bias error

Ouh­nane ver­sus May­filed the clas­sic, but not only, exam­ple of cog­ni­tive bias error

Also, a large issue is the idea that a fin­ger­print is unique.  This has not been validated.

Finally, of major note is that in the real world, the latent unknown print is fre­quently a blurry item with­out suf­fi­cient detail, is of poor res­o­lu­tion and is unlike the known that it is com­pared against, which is typ­i­cally the 10 print card.  The real issue is the applic­a­bil­ity of this com­par­i­son: the known to the unknown.  Does it really trans­late?  Whereas the unknown is fre­quently smudged, smeared or given under con­di­tions of unequal or non-uniform appli­ca­tion of force on the sur­face that results in typ­i­cally a poor res­o­lu­tion lift, the ten print card is more or less pris­tine, not smeared, is the prod­uct of uni­form appli­ca­tion of force on the card sur­face and is of bet­ter resolution.

What a typical "good" latent print of an unknown developed from a crime scene looks like

What a typ­i­cal “good” latent print of an unknown devel­oped from a crime scene looks like